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Hart and Mack: New Restraints on
Mr. Big and a New Approach to
Unreliable Prosecution Evidence
Lisa Dufraimont*

I. INTRODUCTION
The Mr. Big strategy has become one of the most controversial
investigative techniques in Canadian criminal justice. On the one hand, it
seems to have great value as a law enforcement tool, particularly in cold
cases. The technique has been credited with generating the evidence
necessary for conviction in hundreds of serious criminal cases  mostly
homicides  where the perpetrator might otherwise have gone
unpunished.1 On the other hand, the Mr. Big strategy raises grave
dangers. Enticing a suspect to join a fictitious criminal organization and
then making his acceptance within that organization contingent upon his
confessing to a prior crime creates a potential that the suspect may
confess falsely to gain the rewards of membership or to avoid violent
reprisals. Where statements obtained in Mr. Big operations are admitted,
those statements are inevitably accompanied by evidence that the
accused participated in simulated crimes and was eager to join a criminal
organization; this kind of bad character evidence can significantly
prejudice the accused. Finally, in some cases, police involved in these
complex and psychologically manipulative undercover operations may
abuse their power over individual suspects. These dangers are wellrecognized by psychologists and legal scholars, who have frequently
called for the Mr. Big strategy to be strictly limited or eliminated
altogether.2

*

Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University.
See R. v. Hart, [2014] S.C.J. No. 52, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 544, 2014 SCC 52, at para. 4
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hart”] (“the technique has proved indispensable in the search for the truth”).
2
For example, Timothy E. Moore, Peter Copeland & Regina A. Schuller, “Deceit,
Betrayal and the Search for Truth: Legal and Psychological Perspectives on the ‘Mr. Big’ Strategy”
1
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Until recently, however, Canadian law placed few restraints on Mr. Big
operations and the confessions obtained were almost always admissible.3
The legal ground has now shifted with the Supreme Court’s recent
decisions in R. v. Hart4 and R. v. Mack.5 Hart makes Mr. Big confessions
presumptively inadmissible and erects demanding admissibility criteria to
screen such evidence. Mack establishes that even where Mr. Big
confessions are admitted, judges should caution juries about the dangers of
unreliability and prejudice. Taken together, these cases comprise a firm and
coherent response to the dangers raised by Mr. Big operations.
This article examines that response and explores its implications. First,
the Supreme Court’s decisions in Hart and Mack will be reviewed to
illuminate the features of the new legal regime governing confessions in
Mr. Big operations. Next, the potential impact of that regime on the future
of the Mr. Big strategy in Canada will be explored. How are Hart and
Mack likely to change the way police use the Mr. Big technique? And how
are those cases likely to be applied by courts when the Crown seeks to rely
on Mr. Big evidence in future cases? Lastly, the analysis will turn to the
broader implications of Hart and Mack. The potential for elements of the
new Mr. Big regime to be applied to other kinds of undercover operations
will be discussed, as will the Court’s continued willingness to rely on
common law evidence rules in preference to Charter standards in the
context of statements elicited from suspects by police.6 Moreover, it will
be argued that Hart and Mack carry the potential to ground a new approach
to unreliable prosecution evidence more broadly. Following Hart,
trial judges may increasingly use their discretion to exclude prosecution
evidence on reliability grounds. And by adopting in Hart and Mack

(2009) 55 Crim. L.Q. 348 [hereinafter “Moore, Copeland & Schuller”] (cited by Moldaver J. in
Hart, supra, note 1, at para. 57); Steven M. Smith, Veronica Stinson & Marc W. Patry, “Using the
‘Mr. Big’ Technique to Elicit Confessions: Successful Innovation or Dangerous Development in
the Canadian Legal System?” (2009) 15(3) Psychol., Pub. Pol’y & Law 168; Lisa Dufraimont, “The
Patchwork Principle against Self-Incrimination under the Charter” in B.L. Berger, J. Stribopoulos,
eds. (2012) 57 S.C.L.R. (2d) 241, at 258-62 [hereinafter “Dufraimont”].
3
See Dufraimont, id., at 259-61; R. v. Osmar, [2007] O.J. No. 244, 217 C.C.C. (3d) 174
(Ont. C.A.) (neither the pre-trial right to silence nor the voluntary confessions rule applies to Mr. Big
confessions).
4
Supra, note 1.
5
[2014] S.C.J. No. 58, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 3, 2014 SCC 58 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Mack”].
6
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
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a framework that applies to Mr. Big evidence both an exclusionary rule
and a requirement for cautionary jury instructions, the Supreme Court may
have signalled a willingness to accept such overlapping safeguards to
respond to reliability problems in other areas.

II. OVERVIEW OF THE MR. BIG STRATEGY,
HART AND MACK
Generally speaking, the Mr. Big strategy is used to advance the
investigation in high-priority cases like unsolved homicides where the
police have a suspect but lack the evidence needed to lay charges.7
The operation typically begins when an undercover officer or officers
befriend the suspect. Gradually, the suspect learns that his new friends are
members of a (fictitious) criminal organization and the suspect also begins
to work for the organization. Often the suspect is paid generously for
performing simple tasks like delivering packages or counting money. The
suspect learns that involvement in the organization brings significant
financial rewards and that larger rewards can be had by advancing within
the organization. In their interactions with the suspect, undercover officers
emphasize the importance of honesty and loyalty within the organization.
Frequently, scenarios are staged involving simulated violence against
members who have lied to the leader of the organization. After some
period of deepening involvement with the organization, the suspect is
introduced to that leader, Mr. Big, who in a surreptitiously video-recorded
interview presses the suspect to confess his involvement in the crime being
investigated. Mr. Big offers a persuasive reason why the accused should
confess: for example, Mr. Big may claim that the organization needs to
know about the suspect’s prior crime as “insurance” of his loyalty. Mr. Big
often indicates that the suspect’s further participation or advancement in
the organization depends on the suspect confessing to the prior crime. By
all accounts, the Mr. Big strategy is very effective at eliciting confessions
from suspects.8 Until recently, the law imposed few restraints on either the

7
The following summary of the Mr. Big technique draws on Moore, Copeland & Schuller,
supra, note 2, at 351-57 and Kouri T. Keenan & Joan Brockman, Mr. Big: Exposing Undercover
Operations in Canada (Black Point, N.S.: Fernwood, 2010), at 19-21.
8
See e.g., Kate Puddister & Troy Riddell, “The RCMP’s ‘Mr. Big’ Sting Operation:
A Case Study in Police Independence, Accountability and Oversight” (2012) 55:3 Can. Pub. Admin.
385, at 386.
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conduct of Mr. Big operations or the admissibility or use of the selfincriminating statements elicited.
1. R. v. Hart
That began to change with the Supreme Court’s judgment in Hart.9
Nelson Hart was caring for his twin three-year-old daughters when they
drowned in a lake.10 Hart claimed his daughters drowned accidentally but
gave conflicting accounts of events in police interviews. Police believed
that Hart had drowned his daughters on purpose and, two years after their
deaths, they mounted a Mr. Big operation aimed at eliciting a confession
to the two murders.
The Mr. Big operation targeting Hart involved 63 scenarios with
undercover officers over four months. Before engaging Hart directly, police
put him under surveillance, which established that Hart was poor and
socially isolated to the extent that he left home rarely and never without his
wife. Hart was then befriended by two undercover officers, who hired him
as a driver. The officers told Hart that they were members of a criminal
organization headed by a boss and gradually involved Hart in simulated
criminal activities including delivering smuggled alcohol and stolen credit
cards. Over the course of the operation, Hart was paid more than $15,000
for his work and was introduced to a lavish lifestyle that involved travelling
to cities across Canada, staying in hotels and dining in fine restaurants.
By two months into the operation, Hart had embraced his new life and
would frequently tell the officers that he loved them and they were his
brothers. Around this time, one of the undercover officers claimed that
Hart spontaneously admitted planning and carrying out his daughters’
murder. According to the officer, this confession came in response to the
undercover officer telling Hart that he had assaulted a prostitute and that
sometimes the organization required its members to do “bad things”.11
This first confession was not recorded and Hart denied making it. The
operation continued for two more months, during which time the officers
stressed the importance of loyalty and honesty. Near the end of the
operation, the officers told Hart that he could earn up to $25,000 if he
participated in a big deal that was coming up, but that the leader of the
9

Supra, note 1.
This summary is based on the more detailed account of the facts found in the majority
judgment in Hart, id., at paras. 15-39.
11
Id., at para. 29.
10
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organization had found a problem in his background that would have to be
resolved before he could continue to work for the organization. Hart
ultimately met with Mr. Big, who asked him why he had killed his
daughters. Hart claimed that the drownings were an accident but Mr. Big
rejected this explanation as a lie. Mr. Big probed further and Hart gave his
second confession, admitting that he killed his daughters by pushing them
into the lake with his shoulder. Two days later, undercover officers took
Hart to the scene of the drownings, where he gave a third confession and
re-enacted pushing his daughters into the water with his knee.
Shortly after the re-enactment, Hart was arrested and charged with
murder. The trial judge admitted Hart’s self-incriminating statements
during the Mr. Big operation and the jury convicted Hart of two counts of
first degree murder. The Newfoundland and Labrador Court of Appeal
allowed Hart’s appeal and ordered a new trial.
The Supreme Court of Canada was unanimous in dismissing the
Crown’s appeal. Writing for the majority,12 Moldaver J. concluded that the
existing law was not sufficiently protective of suspects who confessed in
Mr. Big operations,13 and that such operations could no longer be
conducted in a “legal vacuum”.14 The majority acknowledged three main
concerns about Mr. Big operations: they may result in confessions that are
false or unreliable, they generate bad character evidence that can prejudice
the accused, and they carry the potential for police misconduct and
abuse.15 At the same time, Moldaver J. acknowledged that not all Mr. Big
operations are abusive and that such operations can generate “valuable
evidence” that should be admitted in the “interests of justice”.16
The majority then proposed a two-pronged approach to the
admissibility of Mr. Big confessions that aims to balance these competing
concerns.17 First, a new common law rule of evidence governs the
admissibility of confessions given in Mr. Big operations. The rule starts
from a presumption that such confessions are inadmissible, but allows for
admission where the Crown establishes on a balance of probabilities that
the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect.18 The
second prong of the analysis relies on a reinvigorated doctrine of abuse of
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

Chief Justice McLachlin, LeBel, Abella and Wagner JJ. concurring.
Hart, supra, note 1, at para. 67.
Id., at para. 79.
Id., at paras. 68-80.
Id., at para. 83.
Id., at para. 84.
Id., at para. 85.
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process to address the potential for police misconduct in Mr. Big
operations.19 The onus lies on the defence to establish an abuse of process.20
Where such an abuse is shown, the trial judge enjoys a wide discretion to
order an appropriate remedy, which may include exclusion of evidence or a
stay of proceedings.21 This two-pronged approach necessitates a voir dire to
determine the admissibility of confessions to Mr. Big.22
Expanding on the features of this two-pronged approach, Moldaver J.
explained that the probative value of Mr. Big confessions is a function of
their reliability.23 Reliability in this context can be assessed by
examining, first, the circumstances in which the statement was made and,
second, any “markers of reliability” in the confession itself or the
surrounding evidence.24 All the circumstances surrounding the making of
the statement should be considered, including:
... the length of the operation, the number of interactions between the
police and the accused, the nature of the relationship between
the undercover officers and the accused, the nature and extent of the
inducements offered, the presence of any threats, the conduct of the
interrogation itself, and the personality of the accused, including his or
her age, sophistication, and mental health.25

In evaluating the confession itself for indicia of reliability, the trial judge
should consider:
 the level of detail in the accused’s confession
 whether new evidence is discovered on the basis of the confession
 whether the confession contains information about the offence that
was not made public (so-called “hold-back” evidence), and
 whether the confession contains accurate information about the
“mundane details” of the crime or the crime scene.26

19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

Id., at paras. 86 and 114.
Id., at paras. 89 and 113.
Id., at para. 113.
Id., at para. 89.
Id., at para. 99.
Id., at paras. 101-105.
Id., at para. 102.
Id., at para. 105.
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The Court emphasized the importance of looking to other evidence to
confirm the reliability of the Mr. Big confession. Such “[c]onfirmatory
evidence is not a hard and fast requirement, but where it exists, it can
provide a powerful guarantee of reliability.”27
On the issue of prejudice, the majority explained that Mr. Big
confessions can give rise to “moral prejudice” against the accused, who
is made to look like a bad person because he wanted to be part of a
criminal organization and committed what he thought were real crimes in
pursuit of that goal.28 Indeed, the defence must emphasize the strength of
the accused’s desire to join the gang, because that desire explains why
the accused might have confessed falsely. Mr. Big confessions can also
create “reasoning prejudice” by distracting the jury from its proper focus
on the offence charged.29 The risk of prejudice may be reduced by
excluding particularly prejudicial information that is not essential to the
narrative of the Mr. Big operation or by offering limiting instructions to
the jury on the use of bad character evidence generated by the operation.
Trial judges are well-situated to weigh prejudicial effect against
probative value in this context and their admissibility decisions will be
treated with deference by appellate courts.30
Turning to the doctrine of abuse of process, the majority observed
that that doctrine reflects certain limits on the state’s exercise of its
investigative powers. Even reliable confessions should not be admitted if
they were elicited by state conduct that is unacceptable or undermines
the integrity of Canada’s justice system.31 In the past, Moldaver J.
acknowledged, the doctrine of abuse of process has done little to protect
suspects who confess in Mr. Big operations. Going forward, the solution
is to reinvigorate the doctrine as it applies to Mr. Big operations, and the
first step in this reinvigoration is “to remind trial judges that these
operations can become abusive, and that they must carefully scrutinize
how the police conduct them”.32 While there is no “precise formula” for
deciding when Mr. Big tactics amount to an abuse of process, the
majority suggested one guideline for the analysis: police conduct is
“problematic in this context when it approximates coercion. In
conducting these operations, the police cannot be permitted to overcome
27
28
29
30
31
32

Id.
Id., at para. 106.
Id.
Id., at para. 110.
Id., at paras. 112-113.
Id., at para. 114.
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the will of the accused and coerce a confession. This would almost
certainly amount to an abuse of process”.33 Coercive police tactics that
rise to the level of an abuse of process include the use of actual or
threatened physical violence against an accused, which will always
render a confession inadmissible, and could also include exploiting the
target’s vulnerabilities, including mental health or addictions issues or
youthfulness. In the view of the majority, preying on these vulnerabilities
is “highly problematic” in the context of Mr. Big operations because such
state conduct offends our sense of decency and fair play.34 Finally,
Moldaver J. noted the potential for Mr. Big operations to become abusive
even when they are not coercive. Trial judges are charged with
determining whether the state’s conduct of a Mr. Big operation was
abusive in all the circumstances of the case.
Applying the new two-pronged admissibility analysis to the facts of
the case, the majority ruled that all three of Hart’s confessions were
inadmissible.35 The Crown’s case depended on these confessions,
especially the second and third confessions that emerged from the
interview with Mr. Big and the re-enactment at the scene of the
drownings. The circumstances in which these confessions were made
“cast serious doubt” on their reliability.36 The Mr. Big operation was long
and intense, transforming Hart’s life, lifting him out of poverty and
introducing him to a lavish lifestyle. Over the course of the operation,
Hart was in almost daily contact with the undercover officers, who he
came to see as his best friends. During the crucial meeting with Mr. Big,
Hart was aware that his continued involvement with the criminal
organization  “his ticket out of poverty and social isolation”37  was
on the line. When Mr. Big rejected Hart’s innocent explanation as a lie,
in all the circumstances Hart faced “an overwhelming incentive to
confess”, whether or not he was guilty.38
Moreover, the confessions carried no markers of reliability.39 Hart
gave inconsistent accounts of how the crime was committed and, more
importantly, there was no confirmatory evidence whatsoever. Hart’s
knowledge of the only verifiable facts in the confessions could be
33
34
35
36
37
38
39

Id., at para. 115.
Id., at para. 117.
Id., at paras. 126-151.
Id., at para. 133.
Id., at para. 139.
Id., at para. 140.
Id., at para. 141.
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explained by his presence at the scene of the drownings. Taken together,
the circumstances of the operation and the absence of confirmatory
evidence indicated that the probative value of Hart’s confessions was
low. By contrast, their potential prejudicial effect was obvious and
significant. For four months, Hart “devoted his entire life to trying to join
a criminal gang”.40 He boasted about killing his small children to win the
approval of criminals. On balance, the limited value of these confessions
was outweighed by their prejudicial effect. Hart’s first confession was
also inadmissible for similar reasons.41
According to Moldaver J., there were features of the Mr. Big
operation against Hart that raised abuse of process concerns. The
operation was “extremely intensive” and exploited Hart’s vulnerabilities
as a poor, socially isolated individual.42 Moreover, the undercover
officers sent Hart on long driving assignments when they knew he was at
risk of having a seizure, arguably putting Hart’s own safety and the
safety of the public at risk. However, having found the confessions
inadmissible under the new common law rule of evidence, the majority
found it unnecessary to decide whether the police conduct in the
operation against Hart was an abuse of process. In the result, the Court
dismissed the Crown appeal and upheld the order for a new trial.
Separate concurring reasons were delivered by Cromwell J. and
Karakatsanis J. While Cromwell J. agreed with the majority’s analysis of
the new legal framework for assessing the admissibility of Mr. Big
confessions, he concluded that a decision about the admissibility of Hart’s
confessions should not be determined at the appellate level. Rather,
Cromwell J. would have left the admissibility question to be decided at the
new trial.43 Justice Karakatsanis agreed with the majority’s conclusion that
Hart’s confessions were inadmissible, but she relied on Charter grounds. In
her view, Hart’s confessions were coerced in violation of the principle
against self-incrimination under section 7 of the Charter. She concluded
that the police conduct was egregious, involving extensive psychological
manipulation and exploitation of Hart’s vulnerabilities that amounted to an
40

Id., at para. 145.
See id., at para. 147. While it was unprompted, Hart’s first confession occurred when he
was already under sway of the social and financial inducements held out by the organization, it
contained no details of the events, and its very existence was contested by the defence. Therefore,
like his later confessions, Hart’s first confession carried a potential for prejudice that outweighed its
limited probative value.
42
Id., at para. 148.
43
Id., at para. 162.
41
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abuse of process. For Karakatsanis J., the risk of a miscarriage of justice
and the abusive police conduct called for exclusion of Hart’s confessions
under section 24(2) of the Charter.44
2. R. v. Mack
Less than two months after Hart was released, the Supreme Court
had another opportunity to consider its approach to Mr. Big confessions
in Mack.45 Police initiated a Mr. Big operation against Dax Mack after
his roommate disappeared and a friend reported to police that Mack had
confessed to killing the roommate and burning his body. 46 The operation
began when Mack was introduced to an undercover officer at a nightclub
where Mack was working as a D.J. Mack was told that the officer was
employed by a criminal organization headed by a boss and over the next
few months Mack did a number of jobs for the organization. Two months
into the operation, Mack met with Mr. Big, who tried to question him
about his missing roommate. Mack asked if he could decline to speak
about it and Mr. Big indicated that that was his choice but that it would
mean he would remain on the third line of the organization. If he wanted
to advance to the first line, he would have to talk about what happened to
the victim.
Three weeks later, Mack told an undercover officer that he was
willing to do what it took to work for the organization. He then confessed
that he shot the victim five times before burning his body, and showed
the officer the fire pit where the body was burned. Mack made a similar
confession to Mr. Big a few days later. The ashes in the fire pit were later
found to contain the victim’s remains and shell casings that had been
fired by a rifle that was found in Mack’s apartment. The Mr. Big
operation against Mack lasted for four months and involved 30 scenarios.
Mack was paid approximately $5,000 plus expenses for his work.
Mack was charged with first degree murder and his confessions
during the Mr. Big operation were admitted at the trial. In charging the
jury, the trial judge emphasized the need to consider carefully the
reliability of these confessions in light of the inducements held out to
the accused and the themes of violence and easy money in the operation.
44

Id., at para. 242.
Supra, note 5.
46
This summary is based on the more detailed account of the facts found in the Supreme
Court’s judgment in Mack, id., at paras. 4-25.
45
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The jury found the accused guilty of first degree murder and his appeal
to the Alberta Court of Appeal was dismissed.
The Supreme Court was unanimous in dismissing the appeal and
affirming the conviction. Writing for the Court, Moldaver J. began by
holding that Mack’s confessions in the Mr. Big operation were clearly
admissible under the two-pronged approach set out in Hart.47 Probative
value was high because the undercover officers offered only modest
inducements.48 Mack was paid $5,000 over four months when he also
had legitimate work. The officers did not use threats and Mr. Big
specifically told Mack that he could decline to speak about the victim
and keep his place on the organization’s third line. The reliability and
probative value of the confessions was also amply confirmed by other
evidence, including the victim’s remains and the shell casings discovered
in the fire pit.49 While the confessions were highly probative, their
prejudicial effect was limited.50 Mack was not involved in any scenarios
involving violence and the work he did for the organization consisted
mostly of repossessing vehicles and making deliveries. On balance, the
probative value of Mack’s confessions in the Mr. Big operation clearly
outweighed any potential prejudicial effect.51 Moreover, the Mr. Big
operation did not involve any improper police conduct that could amount
to an abuse of process.52
Having dealt with the admissibility issue, Moldaver J. proceeded
to analyze how a jury should be instructed about confessions made in
Mr. Big operations. The Court held that even though the new common
law rule of evidence recognized in Hart responds to concerns about
reliability and prejudice, the admissibility rule does not “erase” those
concerns in the Mr. Big context.53 Reliability and prejudice concerns will
persist even when the evidence is admitted. Consequently, trial judges
who admit Mr. Big evidence must instruct juries in a way that gives them
the analytical tools to assess these issues.54 The Court emphasized that no
“magical incantation”55 or “prescriptive formula”56 could be given for
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56

Mack, id., at para. 32, citing Hart, supra, note 1.
Mack, supra, note 5, at para. 33.
Id., at para. 34.
Id., at para. 35.
Id.
Id., at para. 36.
Id., at para. 44.
Id., at para. 50.
Id.
Id., at para. 51.

486

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2015) 71 S.C.L.R. (2d)

such instructions, but did give “some guidance”57 on the content of the
instructions. To equip juries to assess the reliability of a Mr. Big
confession, the trial judge’s instruction should:
 tell the jury that they decide whether the accused’s confession is
reliable, and
 review the factors laid out in Hart that are relevant to the reliability
of the confession, including the circumstances in which the statement
was made and any markers of reliability in the confession itself.58
The trial judge’s instructions can also address the prejudicial effect of the
bad character evidence that comes along with evidence of a Mr. Big
confession. The trial judge should:
 explain the limited purpose for which the evidence of the Mr. Big
operation was admitted, which is to “provid[e] context for the
confession”59
 instruct jurors not to rely on the evidence to go to guilt, and
 remind jurors that “the simulated criminal activity … was fabricated
and encouraged by agents of the state”.60
In the circumstances, Moldaver J. held that while “more could have been
said”61 about the reliability of Mack’s confessions, the trial judge’s
charge was adequate to equip the jury to assess the Mr. Big confessions
in light of the concerns about reliability and prejudice.62

III. THE FUTURE OF MR. BIG
Together, Mack and Hart create a bold new legal framework for
evidence emerging from Mr. Big operations. The judgments represent a
major change in tone in Canadian law. Whereas previously the Supreme
Court has directed more praise than criticism toward Mr. Big operations

57

Id.
See id., at paras. 52-53. The Hart reliability factors are listed in the text accompanying
footnotes 24-25, supra.
59
Mack, id., at para. 55.
60
Id.
61
Id., at para. 59.
62
Id., at para. 61.
58
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and the evidence they generate,63 the Court now appears highly sensitive
to the dangers of false confessions, prejudicial bad character evidence
and police abuse raised by this investigative technique. Hart essentially
accepts all the main criticisms directed at this procedure by
commentators64 and admonishes lower Courts to be on guard against the
risks posed by this evidence.65 While Mack appears at first blush to be
less cautionary in tone, it is significant that Mack acknowledges that
reliability and prejudice concerns are not exhausted by the application of
the exclusionary rule. By calling for cautionary jury instructions as an
additional safeguard even where the evidence is admissible under Hart,
the Court in Mack recognizes that the dangers posed by Mr. Big evidence
are serious and persistent. What, then, is the future of the Mr. Big
strategy in Canada? This section considers the implications of Hart and
Mack for investigators who use the Mr. Big strategy and for Courts
assessing the resulting evidence.
1. Implications for Investigators
In Hart, Moldaver J. predicted that the new approach to Mr. Big
evidence would influence police investigators in two ways. First, since
the state bears the burden of establishing admissibility, “the state will be
strongly encouraged to tread carefully in how it conducts these
operations”.66 Although Moldaver J. did not elaborate on how this new
level of police restraint might manifest itself, it seems likely that Hart
and Mack will discourage police from using strong inducements or
tactics that might be viewed as coercive or abusive. While suspects will
no doubt continue to be offered social and financial inducements to
participate in fictitious criminal organizations, in future police may be
more careful to avoid showering a suspect with cash, luxuries and close
friendships, since these tactics were recognized as undermining the
reliability of the confessions in Hart.67 The analysis in Hart will also
encourage police to be cautious about using violence in Mr. Big
63
See e.g., R. v. Fliss, [2002] S.C.J. No. 15, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 535, 2002 SCC 16, at para. 21
(S.C.C.), cited in Hart, supra, note 1, at para. 114, describing a Mr. Big operation as “skillful police
work”.
64
See, for example, the critical commentaries cited in footnote 2, supra.
65
See especially the Court’s reminder to trial judges that Mr. Big operations can become
abusive and require careful scrutiny: Hart, supra, note 1, at para. 114.
66
Id., at para. 92.
67
Id., at paras. 133-140.
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operations, for three reasons: confessions prompted by fear are less
reliable, violence and threats were identified as coercive police tactics
that can amount to an abuse of process, and scenarios involving violence
can generate prejudice against an accused who shows himself willing to
engage in violence himself.68 Finally, police may think twice before
targeting vulnerable individuals in Mr. Big stings, since the Supreme
Court has identified preying on a suspect’s vulnerabilities as a basis of an
abuse of process claim.69 In some cases, police may forego a Mr. Big
operation because of the potential for the resulting statements to be ruled
inadmissible.
Second, Moldaver J. predicted that the new approach to Mr. Big
evidence would encourage police to keep better records. He explained:
At present, many of the key interactions between undercover officers
and the accused are unrecorded. This is problematic. Where it is
logistically feasible and would not jeopardize the operation itself or the
safety of the undercover officers, the police would do well to record
their conversations with the accused. With the onus of demonstrating
reliability placed on the Crown, gaps in the record may undermine the
case for admissibility, which will encourage better record keeping. 70

This emphasis on record keeping parallels a similar line of reasoning in
the confessions rule cases, where deliberate failure to record a police
interrogation can undermine the Crown’s ability to prove the
voluntariness of the confession beyond a reasonable doubt.71 No doubt
this kind of encouragement from the Courts has increased use of
recording for police interrogations and it will likely have a similar effect
in the Mr. Big context.
Although not explicitly raised by Moldaver J., one might expect to see
one further effect on police investigations going forward. Both Hart and
Mack stress the importance of confirmatory evidence to the analysis of the
admissibility of Mr. Big confessions. Indeed, one of the key features

68

Id., at paras. 102, 117 and 106.
Id., at para. 117.
70
Id., at para. 93.
71
See especially R. v. Moore-McFarlane, [2001] O.J. No. 4646, 47 C.R. (5th) 203, at para. 65
(Ont. C.A.): “the Crown bears the onus of establishing a sufficient record of the interaction between
the suspect and the police. That onus may be readily satisfied by the use of audio, or better still,
video recording. Indeed, it is my view that where the suspect is in custody, recording facilities are
readily available, and the police deliberately set out to interrogate the suspect without giving any
thought to the making of a reliable record, the context inevitably makes the resulting non-recorded
interrogation suspect.”
69
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distinguishing Hart’s inadmissible confessions and Mack’s admissible ones
was that the latter were confirmed by independent evidence. While the
Court insists confirmatory evidence is not absolutely required for
admissibility, the majority in Hart acknowledges that “it can provide a
powerful guarantee of reliability”.72 Given this emphasis on corroboration,
one might expect police to focus more in future on trying to obtain
confirmatory evidence from Mr. Big operations. To the extent that some
investigators may have focused primarily on obtaining self-incriminating
statements from targets, Hart and Mack encourage a shift in emphasis
toward a search for evidentiary confirmation. This shift is salutary and
accords with insights from the academic literature on false confession in
police interrogation, which has long promoted questioning practices that
focus less on obtaining an “I did it” statement and more on finding
confirmation of the statement in the post-admission narrative.73
2. Implications for the Courts
Hart and Mack will work major changes in the courts’ approach to
Mr. Big evidence. In the past, Canadian courts have tended to downplay
the dangers associated with Mr. Big operations, but Hart explicitly puts
judges on notice of the reliability and prejudice problems and the
potential for abuse. The judgment strikes a new tone of caution that will
no doubt shape the development in the case law.
Admittedly, Mack has been criticized for failing to require a sharp
caution on Mr. Big evidence. As Archibald Kaiser has noted, “[w]hat is
missing from this modest guidance [on Mr. Big jury instructions in
Mack] is any of the more direct and chastening language that prefaces the
Hart admissibility standard.”74 The Court might have done well to
require a sharper warning, but one might hope that the cautious tone of
Hart may find its way into jury instructions in any event. The Supreme
Court acknowledged that the trial judge in Mack could have said more
about the risks of the Mr. Big evidence, and if courts are looking for
more to say there is no shortage of sharply cautionary language to draw
on in Hart. This cautious attitude toward Mr. Big operations, heretofore

72

Hart, supra, note 1, at para. 105.
See especially Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, “The Decision to Confess Falsely:
Rational Choice and Irrational Action” (1997) 74 Denver U. L. Rev. 979, at 990-97.
74
H. Archibald Kaiser, “Mack: Mr. Big Receives an Undeserved Reprieve, Recommended
Jury Instructions Are Too Weak” (2014) 13 C.R. (7th) 251, at 261.
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restricted to legal and psychological commentators, has now been
adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada and woven into the fabric of
the law in Hart.
Of course, one must take care not to overstate the probable impact of
Hart and Mack. Mr. Big operations are still legal in Canada, and the
evidence gathered in these operations is likely to be admitted in most
cases. While the presumption of inadmissibility might, on its face, suggest
that exclusion of the evidence will be the norm, logic and experience
suggest otherwise. In weighing probative value against prejudicial effect,
in many cases courts are likely to view the accused’s confessions as highly
probative. The costs of excluding this potentially valuable information —
which may include the collapse of the Crown’s case — will often be seen
as too high. Given the high costs of exclusion, I have argued elsewhere
that exclusionary rules directed at unreliable prosecution evidence should
be expected to result in exclusion in a relatively narrow range of cases
where reliability concerns are particularly acute.75 That expectation is
borne out in the voluntary confessions rule cases where, despite their
presumptive inadmissibility, statements by accused persons to persons in
authority are typically admitted.76 Exclusionary rules are well suited to
capture the most unreliable and prejudicial evidence, such as the
uncorroborated admissions wrung out of Hart by questionable police
tactics. For less problematic confessions to Mr. Big, for example
confessions given in response to mild inducements or where confirmatory
evidence is available, one would expect that admission with a caution
would be the typical result.
This expectation finds some preliminary support in the cases decided
in the one year since Hart. A review of the cases citing the Supreme
Court’s judgment in Hart reveals five instances where trial courts
have applied the new two-pronged approach to the admissibility of
statements made by accused persons during Mr. Big operations:77
75
Lisa Dufraimont, “Regulating Unreliable Evidence: Can Evidence Rules Guide Juries
and Prevent Wrongful Convictions?” (2008) 33 Queen’s L.J. 261, at 283 [hereinafter “Dufraimont”].
76
See id., at 284.
77
In the weeks before this article went to press, three provincial courts of appeal decided
cases in which Mr. Big statements were admitted at trials held before the Supreme Court released its
judgment in Hart. In two cases – R. v. West, [2015] B.C.J. No. 1943, 2015 BCCA 379 (B.C.C.A.),
and R. v. Allgood, [2015] S.J. No. 387, 2015 SKCA 88 (Sask. C.A.) – the appeal courts held that the
statements were admissible under the Hart framework. In the third case, R. c. Laflamme, [2015] J.Q.
no 8925, 2015 QCCA 1517 (Que. C.A.), the Quebec Court of Appeal entered a stay of proceedings
on the basis that the police conduct in the Mr. Big operation amounted to an abuse of process. The
operation involved violent scenarios calculated to convince the accused that his safety would be put
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R. v. Balbar,78 R. v. Keene,79 R. v. Hales,80 R. v. Ledesma81 and R. v.
Magoon.82 In all five cases, the Mr. Big statements were admitted. Each
of these cases reveals a Mr. Big operation with some troubling features.
In Balbar, the operation included a number of staged scenarios involving
serious violence, including one undercover operative apparently forcing
a gun into the mouth of another operative.83 Balbar was also addicted to
methamphetamine during the operation and his level of intellectual
functioning was called into question.84 During the Mr. Big operation in
Keene, the accused expressed concern that the criminal organization
might kill him, saying, “If I’m going to die, then make it quick and don’t
let me see it coming.”85 In Ledesma, the accused brought a gun to a
meeting with the undercover officers.86 In Hales, the target grew close
emotionally with one of the undercover operatives, saying that he was a
brother and he loved him, and the operation also included a serious
simulated assault on a female operative.87 In Magoon, the two targets of
the Mr. Big operation were a couple who were initially unemployed and
living in their vehicle. In the course of an intensive eight-month
operation they acquired an apartment and, among other “powerful
financial inducements”,88 the male target was paid $15,000 for his work.
On the other hand, in all five cases there were factors suggesting
reliability in the circumstances of the Mr. Big operation and in the
confessions themselves. Balbar correctly stated that the victim had been
killed by multiple blows to the head, which was holdback evidence that
had not been made public.89 In Keene, the accused drew a map and
at risk if he were not accepted into the organization. Hart and Mack were also recently applied in a
Mr. Big case at the Quebec Court of Appeal, where a new trial was ordered because the trial judge’s
instructions to the jury were inadequate: Perreault c. R., [2015] J.Q. no 3389, 2015 QCCA 694, 19
C.R. (7th) 393 (Que. C.A.). In addition, there is a developing line of cases considering the
admissibility of Mr. Big statements against persons other than the makers of the statements: see e.g.,
R. v. Campeau, [2015] A.J. No. 679, 18 Alta. L.R. (6th) 180, 2015 ABCA 210 (Alta. C.A.); R. v.
Tingle, [2015] S.J. No. 348, 2015 SKQB 184 (Sask. Q.B.).
78
[2014] B.C.J. No. 3232, 2014 BCSC 2285 (B.C.S.C.) [hereinafter “Balbar”].
79
[2014] O.J. No. 6511, 2014 ONSC 7190 (Ont. S.C.J.) [hereinafter “Keene”].
80
[2014] S.J. No. 750, 2014 SKQB 411 (Sask. Q.B.) [hereinafter “Hales”].
81
[2014] A.J. No. 1468, 2014 ABQB 788 (Alta. Q.B.) [hereinafter “Ledesma”].
82
[2015] A.J. No. 607, 2015 ABQB 351 (Alta. Q.B.) [hereinafter “Magoon”].
83
Balbar, supra, note 78, at para. 201 (scenario 17).
84
Id., at para. 356.
85
Keene, supra, note 79, at para. 90.
86
Ledesma, supra, note 81, at para. 72.
87
Hales, supra, note 80, at paras. 54 and 61.
88
Magoon, supra, note 82, at para. 72.
89
Balbar, supra, note 78, at paras. 358 and 363-364.
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pointed out a specific location where a previously undiscovered part of
the victim’s body was later found by police.90 The trial judge in Ledesma
determined that the accused was not financially vulnerable and was not
subjected to any coercive inducements.91 The self-incriminating Mr. Big
statements given by the two accused in Magoon were confirmed in some
respects by medical evidence and by subsequent intercepted
communications between themselves.92 Hales was consistently told that he
could leave the organization without consequences at any time, and when
he confessed he directed Mr. Big to the remote area where the victim’s
remains were discovered.93 These cases demonstrate the difficulty facing
judges in balancing the many factors going to reliability and prejudice of
statements emerging from complex Mr. Big operations. They also
provide some early indication that, in most cases, courts are likely to
admit Mr. Big statements and offer an instruction to sensitize juries to the
reliability and prejudice problems.

IV. BROADER IMPLICATIONS OF HART AND MACK
This final part of the analysis will explore the implications of Hart
and Mack that go beyond the narrow context of Mr. Big operations. Most
obviously, there is the potential for the admissibility framework
developed in Hart to be applied in other kinds of undercover operations.
Hart also reveals that the Supreme Court remains willing to rely on
common law rules of evidence to protect Charter rights in the context of
self-incriminating statements to police. Finally, it will be argued that
Hart and Mack may suggest a new approach to unreliable prosecution
evidence of other kinds.
1. Application to Other Undercover Operations
In Hart, Moldaver J. specified that the new common law rule of
evidence, the first prong of the two-pronged approach to the admissibility
of Mr. Big statements, applies when “the state recruits an accused into a
fictitious criminal organization of its own making and seeks to elicit a

90
91
92
93

Keene, supra, note 79, at paras. 100 and 149.
Ledesma, supra, note 81, at paras. 122-124.
Magoon, supra, note 82, at paras. 84-94.
Hales, supra, note 80, at paras. 66 and 69.
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confession from him”.94 While he explicitly left open the possibility that
the rule might be extended to other contexts in the future, at this point the
new rule of evidence applies only to evidence obtained in Mr. Big
operations.95 Interestingly, there is no similar language in Hart to limit the
application of the second prong of the admissibility analysis to the Mr. Big
context. Arguably, then, the reinvigorated doctrine of abuse of process as
described in Hart might be applicable outside the precise context of
Mr. Big operations.
One Court has already applied the abuse of process doctrine as
outlined in Hart to another kind of undercover operation. In R. v.
Derbyshire,96 the accused confessed to undercover officers who were
posing as gangsters. The officers accosted her in a parking garage, ordered
her into her car and aggressively demanded that she tell them everything
she knew about the murder they were investigating. The accused
immediately complied but her self-incriminating statements were excluded
on the basis that the police tactics amounted to an abuse of process under
Hart. Justice Wood explained that the undercover officers’ conduct:
resulted in the type of unfair coercion described by Justice Moldaver in
Hart. Ms. Derbyshire’s confession … was obtained by intimidation and
implied threats of harm. She was never given a choice which would
have permitted her to walk away without disclosure. This was an abuse
of process.97

94

Hart, supra, note 1, at para. 85.
See id., footnote 5. One undercover tactic that might be brought within the sphere of
application of the new rule is the one used in R. v. Welsh, [2013] O.J. No. 1462, 2 C.R. (7th) 137
(Ont. C.A.). An undercover police officer posed as a spiritual advisor and practitioner of Obeah, a
system of spiritual and mystical beliefs practised in the West Indies. The officer elicited selfincriminating statements from two men accused of murder by claiming that he could use his mystical
powers to protect them from prosecution if they gave him the details of the murder. The statements
were admitted at trial and the accused were convicted. The Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed the
appeals, reasoning that the accused confided in the Obeahman not for any spiritual purpose but for
the corrupt purpose of protecting themselves from the justice system (id., at paras. 69-73). While
there are important differences between a Mr. Big operation and the spiritually-themed operation in
Welsh, one common factor is the high level of psychological manipulation involved.
96
[2014] N.S.J. No. 689, 2014 NSSC 371, 18 C.R. (7th) 61 (N.S.S.C.).
97
Id., at para. 89. See also R. v. M. (S.), [2015] O.J. No. 5173, 2015 ONCJ 537 (Ont. C.J.),
which was released as this article was going to press. In that case, the trial judge excluded selfincriminating statements made by a young person in circumstances that amounted to an abuse of
process. The statements were elicited by the young person’s father acting as a police agent. The
young person was subjected to manipulative trickery and his vulnerabilities, including his
youthfulness, were exploited.
95

494

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2015) 71 S.C.L.R. (2d)

This ruling appears consistent with the principles laid out in Hart, in
particular the holdings that coercive tactics can amount to an abuse of
process and that a confession obtained with threats of physical violence
must be excluded. Time will tell if other courts will apply the doctrine of
abuse of process as laid out in Hart to undercover operations outside the
Mr. Big context.
2. Common Law Evidence Rules to Protect Charter Rights
There is a tradition in self-incrimination law of relying on common law
rules of evidence to protect the accused’s Charter rights and interests. In R. v.
Oickle,98 the Supreme Court rejected the idea that the Charter subsumes the
common law confessions rule, which remains the pre-eminent legal
safeguard for suspects subjected to police interrogation. Later, in R. v.
Singh,99 the Supreme Court grappled with the relationship between the
voluntary confessions rule and the pre-trial right to silence under section 7
of the Charter. The majority held that the voluntariness rule “effectively
subsumes the constitutional right to silence in circumstances where an
obvious person in authority is interrogating a person who is in detention”.100
The holding in Singh was not that the pre-trial right to silence does not
apply when detainees are interrogated by police, but rather that that Charter
right is adequately protected by the common law exclusionary rule.
Hart continues this tradition of using common law evidence rules to
protect the accused in contexts where the Charter is also engaged. Justice
Moldaver acknowledged that the reliability and prejudice concerns
surrounding Mr. Big confessions raise Charter issues, including the
accused’s right to a fair trial.101 However, he determined that the common
law rule of evidence was the best safeguard to adopt in this context,
reasoning that “our common law rules of evidence are, and must be,
capable of protecting the constitutional rights of the accused”.102 Moreover,
Moldaver J. held that the two-pronged admissibility framework for Mr. Big
confessions reflects and gives expression to the Charter principle against
self-incrimination.103 That principle is not a free-standing right, but rather a
general principle that grounds a number of specific rights in the Charter and
98
99
100
101
102
103

[2000] S.C.J. No. 38, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Oickle”].
[2007] S.C.J. No. 48, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 405 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Singh”].
Id., at para. 39.
Hart, supra, note 1, at para. 121.
Id.
Id., at para. 123.
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in the common law, and the new two-pronged approach has emerged as a
new addition to that set of safeguards. The majority’s decision to fashion a
precise new admissibility framework rather than require the principle
against self-incrimination to be applied directly in every Mr. Big case was
probably wise, since that principle is notoriously broad and conceptually
uncertain. Still, it is noteworthy that common law rules continue to be used
to protect Charter rights in the self-incrimination context.
3. A New Approach to Unreliable Prosecution Evidence?
One of the fundamental purposes of the law of evidence is to protect
the innocent from being convicted on the basis of unreliable evidence.
The Supreme Court’s judgments in Hart and Mack carry the potential to
enhance that protection in two ways. First, Hart lends weight to the
controversial notion that trial judges have discretion to exclude evidence
on reliability grounds. Second, Hart and Mack together break new
ground by adopting both an exclusionary rule and jury instructions to
deal with the same reliability problems. These cases raise the possibility
that such overlapping safeguards will be adopted to respond to reliability
concerns surrounding other forms of prosecution evidence. These two
lines of argument will be addressed in turn.
On the question of discretion, it is well established that trial judges
have discretion to exclude Crown evidence where its prejudicial effect
outweighs its probative value.104 What has been less clear is the extent to
which judges have discretion to exclude evidence on the basis that it is
unreliable. Historically, Canadian law has tended to treat reliability as a
question that goes only to the weight and not to the admissibility of
evidence.105 In Hart, however, the Supreme Court put the reliability of
the evidence at the centre of the admissibility analysis. In enunciating a
new rule of evidence that requires trial judges to weigh the probative
value of Mr. Big confessions against their prejudicial effect, Moldaver J.
made it clear that the admissibility of such statements turns largely on
104
R. v. Grant, [2015] S.C.J. No. 9, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 475, 2015 SCC 9, at para. 19 (S.C.C.);
R. v. Seaboyer, [1991] S.C.J. No. 62, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577 (S.C.C.); R. v. Corbett, [1988] S.C.J. No. 40,
[1988] 1 S.C.R. 670 (S.C.C.). For defence evidence, exclusion is permitted only where its prejudicial
effect substantially outweighs its probative value.
105
See especially R. v. Buric, [1996] O.J. No. 1657, 48 C.R. (4th) 149 (Ont. C.A.), affd
[1997] S.C.J. No. 38, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 535 (S.C.C.). See also R. v. Duguay, [2007] N.B.J. No. 337,
50 C.R. (6th) 378 (N.B.C.A.); R. v. Hodgson, [1998] S.C.J. No. 66, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 449, at para. 2
(S.C.C.) (“the quality, weight or reliability of evidence is a matter for the jury”).
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their reliability.106 Assessing probative value, he explained, “requires
weighing the evidence and assessing its reliability”.107 Weighing the
reliability of evidence at the admissibility stage is unavoidable, the
majority held, even though it “thrusts trial judges into a domain that is
typically reserved for the jury”.108
The discussion in Hart of the trial judge’s role in assessing reliability
at the admissibility stage might be interpreted restrictively to apply only to
Mr. Big confessions. However, Moldaver J.’s analysis of the role of
reliability in the admissibility analysis is framed in broad terms and draws
on cases pertaining to other areas of evidence law.109 It therefore seems
more plausible to interpret Hart as empowering trial judges generally to
exclude evidence on the basis that it is unreliable.110 In this way, Hart has
the potential to broaden the trial judge’s discretion to exclude evidence in a
way that protects the innocent from wrongful conviction.111
Turning to the question of the overlapping safeguards of an
exclusionary rule and cautionary jury instructions, Moldaver J. explained
the need for this multifaceted approach to Mr. Big statements in Mack:
The common law rule of evidence that was set out in Hart was intended
to respond to the evidentiary concerns raised by Mr. Big operations.
However, while this rule responds to these two evidentiary concerns, it
does not erase them. The focus of the rule is to determine whether a
Mr. Big confession should be admitted into evidence. It does not decide
the ultimate question of whether the confession is reliable, nor does it
eliminate the prejudicial character evidence that accompanies its
admission. Thus, even in cases where Mr. Big confessions are admitted
into evidence, concerns with their reliability and prejudice will persist.

106

Hart, supra, note 1, at paras. 94-98.
Id., at para. 96.
108
Id., at para. 97.
109
For example, Moldaver J. supported his conclusions by relying on quotations from R. v. Abbey,
[2009] O.J. No. 3534, 2009 ONCA 624, 97 O.R. (3d) 330 (Ont. C.A.) and R. v. Humaid, [2006] O.J.
No. 1507, 81 O.R. (3d) 456 (Ont. C.A.), cases concerning expert evidence and hearsay, respectively.
110
David M. Tanovich, “Hart: A Welcome New Emphasis on Reliability and Admissibility”
(2014) 12 C.R. (7th) 298, at 302-303 (“where there is reason to be concerned about the reliability of a
particular type of evidence, a trial judge must now ensure that there is sufficient threshold reliability in
the particular case to give the evidence the necessary probative value to warrant its admission”).
111
For commentaries suggesting that trial judges should be empowered to exclude unreliable
evidence to protect the innocent, see Kent Roach, “Unreliable Evidence and Wrongful Convictions:
The Case for Excluding Tainted Identification Evidence and Jailhouse and Coerced Confessions”
(2007) 52 Crim. L.Q. 210; Dufraimont, supra, note 75.
107
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It then falls to the trial judge to adequately instruct the jury on how to
approach these confessions in light of these concerns. 112

The logic of this argument seems unimpeachable. It is plainly true that an
admissibility rule does not exhaust concerns about reliability and
prejudice with a suspect species of evidence like confessions in Mr. Big
operations. However, what might not be immediately apparent is that this
line of reasoning represents a significant departure from the prior
Canadian law of evidence.
When the prosecution relies on evidence that raises reliability
concerns, the law of evidence provides for two basic methods for
addressing those concerns: excluding the evidence or educating the jury
about the reliability problems through expert evidence or, more commonly,
through cautionary instructions.113 Arguably, the best way to protect
against wrongful convictions on the basis of unreliable evidence would be
to exclude the evidence where the danger of unreliability is very high and
to admit the evidence but educate the jury about the reliability concerns in
other cases.114 Before Hart, however, Canadian courts generally resisted
suggestions the same form of unreliable prosecution evidence should be
subject to both an exclusionary rule and cautionary instructions. Rather,
the strong tendency in Canadian law has been to subject each form of
unreliable evidence to only one kind of evidentiary rule.115 For example,
eyewitness identification evidence and unsavoury witness testimony have
been recognized as potentially unreliable forms of evidence that raise a
risk of wrongful convictions. In those contexts, the law of evidence
provides for cautionary instructions to address the reliability problems with
the evidence.116 Attempts to suggest that evidence of these kinds should,
on occasion, be excluded, have generally been rebuffed.117 Similarly,
expert evidence on eyewitness identification evidence has been rejected
as unnecessary largely because of the availability of cautionary jury

112

Mack, supra, note 5, at para. 44.
Dufraimont, supra, note 75, at 280.
114
For fuller argument, see id., at 321-25.
115
See id., at 278, labelling this tendency an implicit “principle of exclusivity”.
116
See R. v. Hibbert, [2002] S.C.J. No. 40, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 445 (S.C.C.), on eyewitness
evidence and R. v. Vetrovec, [1982] S.C.J. No. 40, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 811 (S.C.C.); R. v. Brooks,
[2000] S.C.J. No. 12, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 237 (S.C.C.), on unsavoury witness testimony.
117
See e.g., Mezzo v. R., [1986] S.C.J. No. 40, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 802 (S.C.C.) (the frailties of
eyewitness evidence go to weight, not admissibility); R. v. MacDonald, [2000] N.S.J. No. 143, 184
N.S.R. (2d) 1, 2000 NSCA 60 (N.S.C.A.) (judges have no discretion to exclude unreliable jailhouse
informant testimony).
113
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instructions.118 In the context of confessions in ordinary police interrogation,
on the other hand, the protection against wrongful convictions that the law
provides is the voluntary confessions rule, an exclusionary rule. Canadian
courts have not developed a practice of delivering cautionary instructions
to juries about confessions that are admitted, even though concerns about
the reliability of confessions are undoubtedly not exhausted by application
of the exclusionary rule.119
It should be acknowledged that there are areas of evidence law where
exclusionary rules and jury instructions operate routinely in the same
doctrinal space. Most notably, evidence of the accused’s bad character may
be excluded or admitted subject to a limiting instruction. In that context,
the concern about the evidence is prejudice, not reliability. The evidence is
inadmissible to support prohibited propensity reasoning, but admissible for
other purposes. Properly understood, limiting instructions on bad character
evidence are not an additional evidentiary protection on top of the
exclusionary rule; they are internal to the operation of the exclusionary
rule. Using limiting instructions to explain to a jury the permissible and
impermissible uses of evidence is just one accepted method of enforcing
exclusionary rules.120 Perhaps for this reason, Moldaver J. commented in
Mack that the challenge of delivering limiting instructions to contain the
prejudicial effect of Mr. Big evidence is “more familiar” than the challenge
of instructing the jury on the dangers of unreliability.121
Where the problem with the evidence is its reliability, there are
typically no permissible and impermissible uses to be contrasted. When an
eyewitness identifies a suspect, or an accused confesses under police
interrogation, or a jailhouse informant reports that the accused confessed in
custody, the difficult question is not how the evidence can be used but
118

R. v. McIntosh, [1997] O.J. No. 3172, 35 O.R. (3d) 97 (Ont. C.A.).
See Dufraimont, supra, note 75, at 286 (Canadian law “treats the confessions rule as the
exclusive solution to the false confessions problem and provides no way of controlling the use of
unreliable confessions that may come before the jury despite the rule”). Canadian courts have also
rejected the possibility of educating the jury about the danger of false confessions through expert
evidence: see R. v. Osmar, [2007] O.J. No. 244, 44 C.R. (6th) 276 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Warren, [1995]
N.W.T.J. No. 7, [1995] 3 W.W.R. 371 (N.W.T.S.C.).
120
Justice Rothstein put it this way in R. v. White, [2011] S.C.J. No. 13, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 433,
2011 SCC 13, at para. 30 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “White”]:
The goal of excluding evidence as inadmissible or providing a limiting instruction is
essentially the same: to prevent the jury from considering the evidence, either with
respect to the entire case (for admissibility) or with respect to one or more issues (for a
limiting instruction). Moreover, the same rules of evidence govern admissibility and the
need for limiting instructions.
121
Mack, supra, note 5, at para. 55.
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whether it is true. An instruction warning the jury about the danger of
unreliability is not a limiting instruction but a cautionary instruction that
“leaves evidence for the jury to consider, but warns them to be careful with
it”.122 It is these cautionary instructions that, up to now, have tended to be
employed only in areas where exclusion of evidence is not an option.
The new framework for Mr. Big evidence under Mack and Hart
marks a shift in the law by applying both an exclusionary rule and
cautionary instructions to the same form of unreliable evidence. This
shift opens the possibility that such overlapping safeguards will be
applied to other forms of evidence that raise reliability concerns. If
confessions to Mr. Big that have survived the two-pronged admissibility
analysis still require a cautionary jury instruction, why should the same
not be true of confessions in traditional police interrogation that have
survived the voluntariness inquiry? Interestingly, in the recent case of
R. v. Pearce,123 the Manitoba Court of Appeal overturned a murder
conviction on the ground that the trial judge erred in failing to instruct
the jury on risk of false confessions in case where the confession was
voluntary but still raised reliability concerns. The Supreme Court’s
judgment in Mack lends support to this approach by suggesting that both
an exclusionary rule and cautionary instructions will sometimes be
needed to adequately control for problems of reliability. The Court’s
adoption of a multifaceted approach to Mr. Big evidence in Hart and
Mack may lay the foundation for acceptance of similar overlapping
safeguards in other areas of evidence law.

V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s recent judgments in Hart and Mack are rich in
implications. Most importantly, the cases place some restraints on
Mr. Big operations and the evidence they generate. Police should be
encouraged to be more circumspect in mounting these operations and
the courts should be more vigilant in assessing the resulting confessions.
The judgments also have ramifications beyond the Mr. Big context. They
may be relied on in future cases to place some limits on other kinds of
undercover operations. And finally, the Court’s approach to the reliability
problems of Mr. Big confessions carries the potential to enhance
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White, supra, note 120, at para. 34.
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protections against wrongful conviction based on other forms of
unreliable evidence. Hart can be read as recognizing trial judges’
discretion to exclude unreliable evidence, while Hart and Mack together
suggest that both an exclusionary rule and a rule requiring cautionary
jury instructions may be needed to respond to serious concerns about the
reliability of prosecution evidence.

